



南中國海勢力分布演變

The Trend of Power Disposition in South China Sea

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前言

南中國海爭端與該地區之勢力分布有密切關聯，如果中國成功地宣告其在該地區之領土主權，他便會取得東南亞海上霸權的地位。對於這最後的疆界之爭，東南亞國協（Association of Southeast Asia Nations, ASEAN）（以下簡稱國協）既無法自力抑制中國在南沙群島的活動，亦缺乏制衡力量的外部奧援。

中共勢力的擴散

即使不強調目前中國在南中國海的軍事威脅，但這個問題也絕不容忽視。雖然中國海軍正積極現代化，但其在南沙群島的海上力量尚弱，因南沙群島太小不足以提供為海軍遠洋活動之基地，所以僅在此地區部署小規模的投射戰力，另外在此群島水域欠缺空中力量也限制了中國的影響力，鑑此，中國尚未擁有控制南沙群島之必要軍事力量。況且，要想控制穿越南中國海的海上交通路線，透過強勢的海上霸權及區域優勢比佔領島礁在無合法根據下宣告海上管轄權要來得有效。中共尚未擁有在東南亞形成海上霸權的科技、軍事力量及投射力量，儘管如此，我們仍應注意相關軍事武力部份及地區狀況，相較於一

Foreword

The South China Sea dispute is directly related to the issue of the regional distribution of power. If it succeeds in realizing its territorial claims, China will gain an hegemonic position in maritime Southeast Asia. This final subsection argues that ASEAN is unable on its own to constrain Chinese actions in the Spratly Islands and lacks access to an external source of countervailing power.

The Proliferation of Chinese influence

It is important though not to exaggerate the current Chinese military threat in the South China Sea. Despite the ongoing modernization of its navy, China's naval position in the Spratly Islands remain weak. Disposing of a small power projection, the PRC has not extensively increased its ability to sustain naval operations away from its mainland bases. Most features in the Spratly archipelago are too small to offer bases for further naval activities. China's lack of air power in the Spratlys also limits its influence. Hence, the PRC does not currently possess the necessary capabilities to control the Spratly group militarily. Furthermore, command over the maritime communication routes that cross the South China Sea may only result from a significant naval dominance and superiority in the region rather than the occupation of tiny features that may not offer a legitimate basis for claiming maritime jurisdiction. The PRC does not yet possess the technology, military capabilities and power projection to impose such a naval hegemony in Southeast Asia. Still, military power should also be examined in relative



些東南亞實力較弱且恐於中共區域霸權野心的國家，中國的部署已建立明顯的軍事優勢。此外，中國對國協會員國的懷柔態度「可以被解釋為是務實但短暫性的策略，其目的在拖延時間，厚植其在東南亞的實力，以待擁有足夠的軍事力量來支持其以武力宣告對南海的主權。」簡單的說，對國協主張南海主權者而言，南中國海爭端仍是政治性而非軍事議題。長久來說，它可能變成軍事威脅與主宰東南亞安全的重要課題，同時，或有因誤判或意外導致有限度對峙的危險，但武裝衝突似乎不致發生。

ASEAN 的角色

在南中國海，國協仍無法自力扮演有效的制衡力量。因為未含括軍事合作，而僅仰賴內部互信基礎的合作性安全限制，導致未能形成政治力均衡的公約協定，國協僅致力於衝突的避免及管理，卻缺少任何正式或策略聯盟的二個要件：聯合軍事力量及存在面臨共同威脅的認知。任何考量中國威脅在內之結盟建議都受到安全合作的實質影響，因此，在後冷戰時期，國協未能完成任何有關防衛規劃的處置，即使現在它已盡力強化，卻已經無法抗衡中國在南沙群島的活動，況且，國協之各會員國互相矛盾的安全觀也破壞了東南亞結盟的可能發展。因對中國的立場不一，導致在第三次印度半島衝突期間，內部成員的相互緊張，並衍生在後冷戰時期對南中國海爭端方面造成意見分裂。簡而言之，任何有關南沙群島議題的軍事合作似乎很難達成。

terms and in light of regional standards. China dispose of a significant military advantage when compared to some vulnerable Southeast Asian states that fear its regional hegemonic ambitions. Moreover, China's conciliatory attitude towards the ASEAN states 'may be interpreted as a pragmatic but impermanent tactic intended to buy time, and to foster complacency in Southeast Asia, until China possesses sufficient military power to back up its South China Sea claims with force'. In sum, the South China Sea dispute is still a political rather than a military issue that challenges the ASEAN claimants. In the longer run, it could become a military threat and the dominant security concern in Southeast Asia. In the meantime, an armed conflict seems unlikely although risks exist of miscalculations or accidents that could lead to limited confrontation.

The Role of ASEAN

The Association is unable on its own to act as an effective source of countervailing power in the South China Sea. A conventional practice of balance of power politics is unachievable due to the limitation associated with cooperative security, which excludes military cooperation and relies on an intra-mural basis. Focusing on conflict avoidance and management, ASEAN is devoid of two elements essential for any formal or tacit alliance: joint military capabilities and the existence of a common threat perception. A move towards alliance formation to contain a Chinese threat would be in accordance with a realist interpretation of security cooperation. Yet, ASEAN has not indicated in the post-Cold War any disposition to evolve into a defense arrangement. Even if such a transformation occurred, it would not have the joint military capabilities to deter Chinese actions in the Spratly Islands. Contradictory security perspectives within the Association have also undermined the potential development of an alliance in Southeast Asia. The lack of a common position on the PRC caused intra-mural tensions during the Third Indochina Conflict and has led to divisions with regard to the South China Sea dispute in the post-Cold War. In short, any kind of military cooperation over the



菲律賓態勢的演變

國協成員中缺乏威脅共識的現象在1995年就曾發生過。當時中國利用菲律賓在南中國海的弱勢來擴張其範圍，另外，中國也可能想測試美國對南中國海事務的反應及涉入情形。當時，馬尼拉政府將中國佔領美濟礁視為國家安全的危機，因為它代表該區域中各國所致力維護的區域協議已遭破壞，菲國採取尋求各方支持、破壞中國佔領標記及在1995年3月逮捕中國漁民等報復手段作為回應，之後又宣告其國防現代化計畫，但儘管如此，菲國的海軍裝備仍屬薄弱，甚至無力巡弋卡拉揚群島地區。

印度態勢的演變

中國宣稱將有可能繼續擴張實力至納吐納(Natuna)區域，及美濟礁事件均加深了印度傳統的威脅感，也強化了南中國海週遭國家之反中國政策者的恐懼。1995年7月印度前外長亞拉塔斯(Ali Alatas)訪問中國，但中國卻未澄清對於在納吐納天然氣田水域的主權宣告。領土爭議及推動制止中國策略皆促成蘇哈托在1995年12月決定與澳洲簽署安全協定，該協定原旨在減低雙方因領土劃定所生之誤解，特別是印度不應成為澳洲的可能安全威脅；另外，雙方也建立戰略共同架構及安全共識，此雙邊協定具政治及心理之重要性，但卻未能據以強化印度之國防力量；儘管如此，卻代表印度的戰略態勢轉變，且也是典型傳統政治力量平衡的例子。印度及澳洲在制衡中國在南中國海活動方面獲得共同之安全利益，這個協定提昇了聯合軍事作戰能力，並強化區域間兩

Spratly issue particularly unlikely.

The Evolution of Philippine

The absence of a common threat perception among the ASEAN states was, for example, demonstrated in 1995. The PRC took advantage of Philippine vulnerability to expand its presence in the Spratly Islands but perhaps also to test the US reaction and involvement in the South China Sea problem. Manila viewed the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef as a danger to its national security mostly because it represented 'a breach of the regional modus vivendi which regional states had been painstakingly trying to develop'. The Philippines responded firmly to the discovery of the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef by seeking multilateral support and taking retaliatory measures that included the destruction of Chinese territorial markers on other features and the arrest of Chinese fishermen in March 1995. The Philippines also announced a defense modernization program. However, its navy has remained so ill-equipped that it cannot even be expected to patrol the Kalayaan.

The Evolution of Indonesia

Indonesia's traditional threat perception was confirmed by the Mischief Reef incident and the suspected extension of Chinese claims to include the Natuna region. China's behavior reinforces the fear among the military elite of a Chinese irredentist policy in the South China Sea. During his visit to the PRC in July 1995, Indonesia's foreign Minister Ali Alatas was provided with no clarification regarding the Chinese claims to the waters above the Natuna gas fields. Indonesia's involvement in the territorial dispute and the need to develop a deterrence strategy against the PRC played a part in Suharto's decision to sign a security agreement with Australia in December 1995. It was an attempt to reduce persisting mistrust between two states that had no territorial designs on each other. In particular, the agreement indicated that Indonesia should not be perceived in Australia as a possible threat to its security. It also tacitly acknowledged that both states shared a common strategic outlook and simi-



國國防關係，且意味著，若有對兩個或其中一個國家的安全利益有挑戰時，雙方都將採取適當的反應步驟。這個協定不僅傳遞給北京方面某種政治訊息，且間接地強化印度與美國的防衛關係，並在合作性安全以外，印度目前積極藉由傳統的抗衡方式來處理與中國的關係，而且約制中國侵犯南中國海的野心。1996年9月印度也在納吐納地區舉行大規模的軍事演習。談到這些演習，一位服務於印度國科會的安全分析家說，儘管印度在外交上與中國仍維持關係，但「我們絕不可以心存幻想。中國看重實力，如果他發現你弱不禁風，它會活活將你吞掉」。

馬來西亞與新加坡之策略

馬來西亞與新加坡對中國採取較溫和的策略。馬來西亞積極維持及推展與中國之經濟關係，即使須全力來對付另一個國協成員為代價亦在所不惜。1995年1月，馬來西亞前總理馬哈迪博士(Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad)說：「該是我們不再視中國為威脅的時候了，且須把它視為無限的機會。」這不僅代表馬國威脅觀之改變，也意味著對菲國之批評。另外，兩國對中國及南中國海問題也有截然不同的做法，菲國將領土問題國際化，而馬國則傾向與中國雙邊協商。1995年5月期間，新加坡前總理吳作棟(Goh Chok Tong)曾提及與中國討論其南中國海政策對國協成員所引發的不安全感是必要的；但是，與其說是對實務的看法，這段說詞毋寧說是強調其國家在東南亞的地位及突顯國協中的整體性。在一次海峽時報的訪問中，資深總理李光耀試圖降低美濟礁事

lar security concerns. The bilateral agreement had mostly a political and psychological significance and did not modify Indonesia's defense capability. Yet, it marked a revision of a strategic outlook by Indonesia and could still be examined as an example of conventional balance of power politics. Indonesia and Australia shared a security interest in constraining Chinese actions in the South China Sea. The agreement mentioned the possibility of joint military operations and was regarded regionally as formalizing existing defense ties between the two states. It declared the Indonesia and Australia would consult 'in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each party'. The agreement sent a political signal to Beijing and indirectly consolidated Indonesia's defense ties with the United States. In addition to cooperative security, Indonesia seemed now willing to rely on traditional countervailing tactics to manage its relation with the PRC and restrain China's irredentist ambitions in the South China Sea. In September 1996, Indonesia also held extensive military exercises in the Natuna region. Discussing these exercises, a security analyst at the Indonesia Institute of Science declared that though Indonesia is engaged diplomatically with the PRC, it 'would be foolish for us to be completely naive. China respects strength. If they see you as being weak, they'll eat you alive'.

The Strategies of Malaysia's and Singapore's

In the meantime, Malaysia and Singapore adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the PRC. Malaysia was eager to preserve and further develop its economic ties with China, even at the cost of collective solidarity towards another ASEAN member. In January 1995, Malaysia's Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad declared that 'it is high time for us to stop seeing China through the lenses of threat and to fully view China as the enormous opportunity that it is'. While indicating the shift in Malaysia's



件及中國侵犯南中國海的影響，簡單的說，新國傾向不要疏遠中國的做法。

越南、泰國之策略

在1992年7月國協的外交部長年會中，越南開始參加敦睦合作協議，並且受邀成為未來各項會議的觀察員，接著在1994年12月成為會員。這使得國協更深陷於南沙群島議題，且喪失了有關西沙群島領土爭議的中立立場。國協的初始會員國間存在不同的安全觀，印尼認為越南是對抗中國區域野心的同盟而積極促成越南加入國協，相反地，泰國卻與越南在影響柬埔寨及寮國上較勁。另外，泰國及新加坡卻憂心越南潛在威脅，而期望與中國維持強固關係。儘管越南與原國協會員間和解的制度化過程影響1995年7月11日美越關係正常化，卻未使他們在地區勢力分布方面獲得改善。相反地，中國成為在後冷戰期間東南亞戰略環境轉變的主要獲益者。況且，越南加入國協後並未強化該組織的政治協定平衡力量，以制衡中國在南中國海的活動。除了來自越南的部分支援外，菲律賓只能靠自己反抗中國對於南沙群島的宣告，1998年國協未能協助菲國抗拒中國在美濟礁上擴建建物便是一例。簡而言之，國協無法有效成為抗衡力量，而須仰賴外在軍事力量的支持才有可能制衡中國在南中國海的活動，然而國協並不喜歡外援的抗衡力量，國協會員國中仍有領土爭議的會員國，尤其是菲律賓，均未獲得其他軍事支援以制衡中國在南中國海的活動。就此觀點，第三次中南半島衝突與南中國海爭端顯示極不同的權力型態。

threat perception, the statement was also an implicit criticism of the Philippines. The Philippines has aimed to internationalize the territorial question while Malaysia has been more inclined to negotiate bilaterally with China. During his visit to the PRC in May 1995, Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong mentioned the need to discuss the feeling of insecurity that the Chinese policy in the South China Sea provoked among the ASEAN members. Yet, rather than an actual sign of concern, this declaration was meant to confirm the Southeast Asia identity of the city-state and express ASEAN solidarity. In an interview with the Straits Times, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew played down the Mischief Reef incident and China's aggressiveness in the South China Sea. In short, Singapore was keen not to alienate the PRC.

The Strategies of Vietnam's and Thailand's

Vietnam adhered to the TAC in July 1992 during the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers and was invited to participate as an observer on future occasions. Its forthcoming membership was announced in December 1994. The enlargement presented some difficulties. ASEAN became more deeply embroiled in the Spratly issue and lost its neutral position in the territorial dispute over the Paracel Islands. Different security outlooks also coexisted among the original members. Indonesia regarded Vietnam as an ally against China's regional ambitions and actively supported its participation. In contrast, Thailand was in competition with Vietnam over influence in Cambodia and Laos. In addition, Thailand and Singapore were still concerned about a potential Vietnamese threat and wished to maintain their strong ties with the PRC. Nevertheless, the institutionalization



美國的角色

美國自菲律賓撤離軍事基地的同時也撤離了在卡拉揚地區制止中國行動的動力，因為持續屯駐的美軍或可限制中國控制美濟礁的行動。1992年美軍撤離、日本退出此區域相關事務及蘇聯減少在越南的海軍活動，皆使得中國成為南中國海政策的主宰。不過新加坡在1990年11月與華盛頓簽訂協議，除了維持與中國的關係外，新加坡積極將美國力量拉入，以促使東南亞呈現穩定的勢力均衡，但它提供容納美軍設施的決定，原來曾造成馬來西亞及印尼的不悅，直到美國自菲律賓撤軍後才逐漸改變。而且在1992年以後，馬來西亞與印尼也準備提供美國海軍類似的活動途徑，自1984年以後，馬來西亞皇家海軍已經與美國海軍每年舉行聯合演習；另一方面，1992年美國海軍後勤單位自菲律賓遷移至新加坡，使得新加坡擴展了與美國的關係，1998年1月新加坡宣稱，美國的航空母艦將可於2000年工程結束後駛入樟宜海軍基地；甚至菲律賓也努力降低1992年後美國撤軍的影響，1998年2月10日菲律賓參議院決議通過了1999年5月與美國敦睦艦隊重新實施聯合操演的協定；在美國自菲律賓撤軍僅7年後，菲國期望與華盛頓簽訂雙邊協定可能與菲國無力巡弋及保護卡拉揚地區有關。因此，美軍自蘇比克灣海軍基地及克拉克空軍基地撤離後，其在東南亞的部署並未大受影響，甚至在2001年911恐怖攻擊事件後，美國有關東南亞的戰略有增無減，菲律賓也是國協會員中在美國遭恐怖攻擊後唯一仍歡迎美軍進駐的國家。缺乏外部抗衡力量以制衡中國在南中國海的活動應不能全歸責於美

of the process of reconciliation between Vietnam and the original ASEAN states, which influenced the normalization of US-Vietnamese relations on 11 July 1995, has not modified the regional distribution of power to their advantage. On the contrary, the PRC has been the prime beneficiary of the changing strategic circumstances in East Asia in the post-Cold War. Moreover, Vietnam's membership has not improved ASEAN's ability to practice conventional balance of power politics to constrain Chinese actions in the Spratlys. Except for some support from Vietnam, the Philippines is therefore isolated in its attempt to resist the Chinese claims in the Spratlys. The Association failed, for example, to support Manila in its protest against the Chinese expansion of its structures on Mischief Reef discovered in November 1998. In short, the Association cannot operate on its own as an effective source of countervailing power and needs to rely on external military support to constrain China's actions in the Spratlys. Yet, ASEAN does not enjoy access to an external source of countervailing power. The member states involved in the territorial question, above all the Philippines, do not benefit from external military assistance to contain the PRC in the South China Sea. In that respect, the Third Indochina Conflict and the South China Sea dispute indicate very different patterns of power.

The Role of United States

The US departure from its military bases in the Philippines removed a source of deterrence against Chinese actions in the Kalayaan, as an ongoing US



國戰略上的撤守，而應該說是美國不願涉入領土管轄問題所使然。與台灣和朝鮮半島情勢比較，美國國會不認為南中國海爭議是有安全顧慮的，事實上，美國涉入所帶來的益處可能因國協會員欠缺彼此共識而受限，甚至，部分會員國，如馬來西亞及印尼，並不支持美國直接介入南海議題。簡而言之，雖然中國未部署必要兵力以在東南亞成為海上霸權，但南中國海的軍力失衡必繼續增加，且可能使中國用武力解決領土的爭議。

結論

國協各國並未遵守1992年的南中國海宣言，且近年來國協積極促成簽署行為規範的努力也告失敗；取而代之的，中國與國協簽署了南中國海鄰國的行為宣告，它可說僅是鬆散、弱化的行為規範文件，再說，國協確已無力維持南中國海的勢力均衡。因為安全合作的限制、欠缺外在抗衡的協助力量以及欠缺公約的平衡力量使它無力處理爭端。類似的原因皆造成組織及勢力均衡觀的淪喪，缺乏一致性的原則及共同的威脅感，使得外部安全議題之共同立場難以形成而更形複雜；因為領土爭議使內部缺乏凝聚力，亦導致無法獲得外部政治及軍事力之支援，皆削弱了國協的群體力量，並使公約的政治力平衡付之闕如。

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presence might for instance have dissuaded the PRC from taking control of Mischief Reef. China has become a dominant strategic player in the South China Sea due to the 1992 US withdrawal, Japan's limited involvement in the area and the scaling down of Russian naval activities in Vietnam. However, Singapore reached an agreement with Washington in November 1990. Despite its good relations with the PRC, the city-state was eager to secure a US engagement to uphold a stable distribution of power in Southeast Asia. Singapore's decision to accommodate US facilities was first not well received in Malaysia and Indonesia. These views later changed with the planning of the US withdrawal from the Philippines. After 1992, Malaysia and Indonesia were prepared to provide access to the US Navy. The Royal Malaysia Navy had already been conducting annual joint exercises with the US Navy since 1984. Singapore extended its links with the United States in 1992 when a US Navy logistics unit relocated from the Philippine to the city-state. In January 1998, Singapore announced that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000. Even the Philippines has attempted to lessen the effect of the 1992 US withdrawal. Initially signed on 10 February 1998, the Philippine Senate ratified in May 1999 a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States that enabled the resumption of joint military exercises. The Philippine desire to reach a bilateral agreement with Washington only seven years after the American departure can be associated with its inability to patrol and protect the Kalayaan. Hence, the US deployment in



Southeast Asia has not been overly affected by its withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Furthermore, the US strategic involvement in Southeast Asia has increased after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Philippine is the only ASEAN member that has so far welcomed US military troops on its territory since the terror attacks in the United States. The absence of an external source of countervailing power to constrain Chinese actions in the Spratlys does not result from a US strategic retreat. Instead, it arises from a US unwillingness to get involved with the question of sovereign jurisdiction. In contrast to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, the US Congress does not consider the South China Sea dispute as a vital security concern. In fact, the benefits provided by a US involvement would most likely be limited due to the absence of an intra-mural consensus. Moreover, some member states, primarily Malaysia and Indonesia, do not support the need for a more direct US participation in the Spratly issue. In short, though China does not dispose of the necessary capabilities to impose a naval hegemony in Southeast Asia, the military imbalance in the South China Sea should be expected to increase and may influence the PRC to use force to solve the territorial dispute.

Conclusion

All the ASEAN countries have not respected the 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea and recent attempts by the Association to formulate a code of conduct have failed. Instead, China and ASEAN signed a Declaration on

the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a non-binding and watered-down document that might lead, though this is rather unlikely, to the adoption of a detailed and binding code of conduct. Moreover, the Association has failed to bring the balance of power to bear in the South China Sea. Its involvement in the dispute has been defined by the absence of conventional balance of power politics due to the limitations associated with cooperative security and the lack of access to an external source of countervailing power. Similar factors help explain the absence of associative and balance of power perspectives. The lack of shared principles and a common threat perception complicate the attainment of a common stand on an extra-mural security issue. The unavailability of external diplomatic and military support, which results to a certain extent from the absence of intra-mural cohesion over the territorial dispute, weakens ASEAN's collective efforts and makes the practice of conventional balance of power politics unachievable.